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BOOKS REVIEWED

LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT. By James Marshall. New York:

Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1966. Pp. xiv, 119. $5.95.
The author of this book, Mr. James Marshall,1 quotes approvingly
from the closing words of a well-known article by Messrs. Hutchins
and Slesinger: 2 "By careful use of [the scientists'] ...proved results
in [psychology] and other fields, we may yet build a law of evidence
more closely related to the facts of human behavior." Mr. Marshall
then declares that "the purpose of this book [is] to carry this line of
thought further in the light of more recent studies by social-psychologists."3 Thus, quite justifiably, one could have expected the author to
have tried to construct new rules of evidence which were more in harmony with the findings of modern social-psychology. But, alas, he has
not attempted this altogether necessary, though difficult task.
Instead, Mr. Marshall shifts and narrows his focus, saying that first,
he will consider only "the conflict between the law of evidence and
empirical research and the need to press further research to devise
means to gain greater accuracy in evidence on which to determine
responsibility, damages, and guilt;" and secondly, he will discuss "the
trial process and its effects on the search for reality."4 But the fact is
that Mr. Marshall does not deliver on these claims either. He does not
exhaustively and systematically explore the conflicts between "the law
of evidence" (rules of evidence?) and "empirical research." There is
much psychological and other "empirical research" left untouched by
this book, and only a few of the rules of evidence are mentioned; thus
in these respects the author has overstated his claims. In fact, what
Mr. Marshall actually does is to limit himself severely to some of the
3
findings of one school of psychology--"transactional psychology" Land to compare these findings with what he believes to be the assumptions underlying the "law of evidence."
Before proceeding further, I think a few of the book's vital statistics
would help reveal its fundamental character. The author seeks to
achieve his ends in 107 pages which have been divided into three
'Mr. Marshall is a lawyer and a member of the New York Bar. He has taught
Human Relations in Administration at N.Y.U. and has authored several books,
receiving Columbia University's Butler Medal for one of them.
'Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations On The Law of Evidence-Memory.

41 HARv.L. REv. 860, 873 (1928).
aP. 3.
'Ibid. Needless to say, the author is unclear about his aims.
P. 10. See, e.g., EXPLORATIONS IDNTRANSACTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (Kilpatrick ed.
1961).
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chapters.' Chapter one, of forty pages, is devoted to setting forth
"perception," "recollection," and "articulation," as understood in the
literature of transactional psychology, and comparing its findings with
believed fundamental assumptions of "the law of evidence." Chapter
two, of forty-three pages, is a report of some research on "recollection"
done by the author with others.' Chapter three, of twenty pages, is
devoted to a discussion of "Psychological Transactions in the Trial."
A conclusion covers four pages. I shall discuss the book as a single
unit because its theme consistently clusters around "perception," "recollection," and "articulation," and because these notions are fundamental to the major claims made by the author; that is, they bear on his
dominant thrust.8
Basically, Mr. Marshall sets out to challenge the "implicit, if not
always explicit,. . . assumption [of all the rules of evidence] that witnesses can see accurately, hear accurately, and recall accurately...
[which] is in fact contradicted by the findings of psychological science."29 Having set up this straw man, the author proceeds to demolish
him, organizing his critical demolitions around the notions of "perception," "recollection," and "articulation." Strangely, the process we call
"conceptual" is neither discussed, nor separated out from the other
notions, thereby injecting confusion into the book as a whole.
According to transactional psychology the correspondence between
an object, or event, and our perception of that object, or event, is
never absolutely identical. It is always "close" or "closer" to reality,
but never the same as reality. In discrete ways, each physical aspect
of our environment, and each event that we witness, i.e. "perceive,"
will vary slightly, or greatly, for each person who witnesses them. The
reason is that an individual "perceives" his environment, and environmental events, according to his previous personal experiences. Although there is only one "reality," no two perceptions of that reality
will be identical for the reason that no two persons have had identical
past, personal experiences.
The factor of personal experience plays a vital role in "perception."
' Nothing of substance is added by the Forward contributed by Mr. Lee Loevinger,
Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission and former Judge of the
Minnesota Supreme Court.
Helge Mansson, Ph.D, and Mr. John VanEsen.
' Which, as I understand it, is to consider "the conflict between the law of evidence and empirical research and the need to press further research to devise means
to gain greater accuracy in evidence on which to determine responsibility, damages
and9 guilt." P. 3.

P. 8.
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We tend to "perceive" things, and events, in such ways as to make
them harmonize and "fit in" with our previous experiences. 10 For
example, if a person is put in a dark room where he no longer has
significant points of reference for what he sees, and if he is then shown
a playing card that is twice the size of a conventional playing card, he
usually will not "perceive" the actual size of the card because he
doesn't have previous experiences that would condition him to have
such expectations. Instead, such a person would usually "perceive"
the card as being twice as close to him rather than being twice as large.
Distortion of distances is "perceived" in order than an individual might
harmonize the "reality" with his past, personal experiences. (There
are obvious inferences here for automobile injury litigation). A perception is dependent upon the perceiver as well as upon the location of
the thing, or event; its nature and the time when it is perceived as
well as the circumstances under which it is perceived.
Past, personal experiences play another, and critical, role. They are
relevant when we "select" things, or events, to perceive, and when we
"choose" not to perceive. That is, if there are gaps in a person's perceptions, he will tend to "harmonize" (cohere?) them by eliminating
the gaps and creating a "perception" which is consistent with that
person's overall interpretation of the thing, or event. On the other
hand, if a "perception" of a thing, or event, tends to be inconsistent
with the overall view, as conditioned by past, personal experience, he
will tend to repress and forget that "perception" in an effort to produce
the likeliest explanation for what he "sees." It should now be clear
that a person's "perceptions" are functions of his personal experiences
i°See, e.g., Stagner, Personality Dynamics and Social Conflict, 17 J. SocIAL
IssuEs 28, 33 (1961). Danger and stress also affect a person's ability to estimate
time and distance accurately. See, FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITVE DIssoNANCE 235-43 (1957). This psychological finding is used to criticize the res gestae

rule which allows spontaneous utterances on the theory that the stress of nervous excitement makes for a spontaneous and sincere response; that is, a witness

will not deliberately lie during such circumstances, nor calculate advantages and

make self-serving declarations. See Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 92 P.2d 1113, (1939).
The psychological point is that the impact of trauma distorts the "perception"; but
granting this, I fail to see why the author believes that this is fair criticism of the
res gestae rule, unless he wishes to hold that every utterance is so distorted as to be
valueless-a claim he does not make. Also, the quality of the utterance, and hence
the evidentiary weight ascribed to it, can be thoroughly tested by cross-examination.
If such a statement cannot be so tested, then it is probably hearsay and inadmissible.
See MPEISENHOLDER, EVIDENcE: LAW AND PRACTicE 380-82 (1965). The general
reliability of distance and motion perceptions of witnesses has been discussed in
Gardner, The Perception and Mremory of Witnesses, 18 CORNEI. L.Q. 391 (1933);
see also Bartley & DeHardt, A Further Factor in Determining Nearness as a
Function of Lateral Orientationin Pictures,50 J. PSYCHOLOGY 53 (1960).
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as well as the thing, or event, "perceived." Thus, the current dogma of
transactional psychology is that the percipient plays an active and
vital role and conditions the "perception," perhaps as much as the
reality which is being "perceived."' 1
Recollection, too, is subject to the vagaries of the psyche and its
social and physical environment. We all know that memory is fallible,
and Mr. Marshall presents us with several general illustrations. For
example, memory is usually selective, tending to be more powerful
when a person recounts his successes rather than his failures, 2 and
when a person recalls facts that support rather than contradict his
biases. 13 In addition, the accuracy of a recollection, itself, is subject
4
to many influences. It seems to vary with the amount of suggestion,'
one's educational attainments, 5 social status,16 punitiveness,' 7 and
other factors.'" The point of all this is that "the 'reality' brought to the
case is a function not only of the perception of the witness but also of
his individual personality .... ",19
"Reality" is also distorted by a witness's articulation. Words are
slippery chameleons with varying hues of meaning, and few of us,
when we verbalize, take our limitations into account. Words may fail
to describe accurately the perception that they report, and it is always
possible that they may report an inference made by the witness, rather
than observed fact. The manipulation of words is, after all, nothing
more than the manipulation of words. Language, itself, forces thought
into its word and logic molds, and, in that sense, it becomes a way of
'It should be obvious that the word "perception" is used here in two senses: one
describes reality seen and the other describes a person's "conceptions" of that reality.
By not keeping these two notions distinctly separate, the author has produced a great
deal of unclarity and confusion, as has "transactional psychology." The "conceptual
process" is clearly different from the "perceptual process."
' See Horowitz, Psychological Need as a Function of Social Environnentis, in
THE STATE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (White ed. 1956).
" See Levine & Murphy, The Learning and Forgetting of Controversial Material,
in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYcHOLOGY 44-101 (Macoby, Newcomb & Hartley 3d. ed.
1958). Also, interrupted tasks seem to be better remembered than those which have
been completed. See Horowitz, The Recall of Interrupted Group Tasks, in GRoup
DYNAmics: RESEARCH AND THEORY 370 (Cartwright & Zender ed. 1960).
" See generally MijNSTERBERG, PsYcHOLOGY: GENEaA AND APPLIED 401-02, passint
(1914). Clearly, the rule that allows a witness to refresh his recollection can be
wrongly used by a lawyer when preparing his case by making certain suggestions
as to what a witness should testify, and thereby improperly influencing the witness.
Although I agree with the author that this can, and does, occur, it does not militate
so much against the rule as against a certain type of lawyer.
"P.
49.
'6 P. 52.
"P. 70. See also ADORNo, THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950).
"See FRomm, MAN FOR HImsELF 235 (1947).
'P.

31.
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viewing the world,20 and constitutes a rigidifying process,2 1" -all of
which can distort the reality that is reported by a witness at trial.
Not only do all these psychological processes affect the capacity of
a witness to testify accurately at trial, but they also apply to the judge
and jury and affect them. For a juryman, or for a judge, the "event"
of reality is the testimony of the witness at trial, or the "seeing" of a
physical thing introduced into evidence. It is not the actual reality
itself. Everything is secondary and derivative in the courtroom. Thus,
all the vagaries that affect a witness's perceptions, recollection, and
articulations are bound together in the testimony which becomes the
juryman's "reality." The juryman moreover, has a psyche and his
reality is subject to psychological distortions of perception, recollection, and articulation. Thus, legal reality may be a product of at least
dual distortion, not to mention the intentional confusions which a
lawyer might introduce. The net result of the entire legal process
then, is an awkward and humanly imperfect way of arriving at primary "truth. '22 And, of course, one party's preponderance is another's
failure of proof.
But, even so, Mr. Marshall presents us with neither an alternative,
nor the broad outlines of one. 3 In fact, he fails even to set forth
clearly the exact nature of the conflicts to which he alludes as existing
between the rules of evidence and the findings of transactional psychology. 24 What he does do is erect a straw man of the omniscient
See KLuCKHOHN, MIRROR FOR MAN 113-30 (1959).
= See generally FODOR & KATZ, THE STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE (1966) ; KORZYBSXI,
SCIENCE AND SANITY (1941) ; MoRRIS, SIGNS, LANGUAGE AND BEHAVIOR (1946) ; and
OGDEN & RIcHuRas, THE MEANING OF MEANING (1925).
'This has been emphasized by Jerome Frank; see his LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND (1930), and COURTs ON TRIAL (1949).

' At times he seems to suggest that we should do away with the adversary system
itself: "courtroom combat, this 'adversary duel,' is a sublimation of more direct
forms of hostile aggression in primitive societies ... the combat, the duel, the game
are certainly not the best ways to discover truth...." Pp. 6-7, 35. Apart from this
being sheer rubbish, the author contradictorily calls for a "liberalization of certain
rules... within the framework of litigation as an adversary proceeding." P. 40.
"At 14 he notes that rumor, which is excluded from testimony by the hearsay
rule, might form a portion of a person's previous experience, thereby conditioning
his "perception," to which a witness is allowed to testify. However, he does not
consider whether cross-examination might either reveal or eliminate the bias. At
16, Mr. Marshall refers to the res gestae rule; see note 10 supra. At 29, he holds
that the rule permitting refreshment of recollection might be used by a lawyer
to suggest testimony to a witness ; see note 14 supra. On two pages (38-40)
the author deals with the rules involving declarations against interest, self-serving
declarations and testifying to conclusions without relating them to his prior discussion of "perception," "recollection" or "articulation." He contends, without proof,
that declarations against interest are neither more, nor less, "truthful" than selfserving declarations for the reason that, from a psychological point of view each
"is motivated by, and is an expression of, a need." This statement utterly confuses
the cause of an utterance [a psychological need]with its substantive content [whether
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witness who accurately perceives all, recalls all and verbalizes all, and
then asserts that this conception underlies the rules of evidence generally. He, then, produces his psychological findings to demolish that
straw man, which he does very well, showing that fallible humans are
humanly fallible. So much was noted over two thousand years ago by
Thucydides when he said that we make up individualistic versions
of the past "adhering as closely as possible to the general sense of
what was really said."2 Recognizing this well-worn truth, AngloAmerican legal practice has developed the art of cross-examination,
one purpose of which is to show the unreliability of a witness's testimony, whether it falters on "perception," "recollection," or "articulation." But nowhere in his book does Mr. Marshall consider the ameliorative effects of cross-examination. This is of crucial significance because the rules of evidence operate in a legal context which includes
cross-examination, and other safeguards such as timely objections.
After reading this book I can agree with the author that we need
to establish a "closer relation between law and psychology" 26 and that,
perhaps, by a careful use of materials from psychology and other fields,
"cwe may yet build a law of evidence more closely related to the facts
of human behavior."2 7 I can agree with him, and still conclude that
the task remains unfulfilled by this volume.
Arval A. Morris*

it is true or not]. Secondly, it simply is not true that "the rules of the game of litigation are founded on the belief that self-serving declarations will be taken literally and
must be excluded." They are excluded because they are hearsay, and not because they
are self-serving. See In re Witte's Estate, 21 Wn. 2d 112, 150, P.2d. 595 (1944) and
cases cited therein. See also, Palin v. General Const. Co., 47 Wn. 2d. 246, 287 P.2d 325
(1955); MEISENOLDER, EViDENcE: LAw AND PRAcrIcE 380-82 (1965). Finally, he asserts that although a witness may not testify as to his reasons or his conclusions, a
witness frequently does so under the guise of his conclusion being a part of his observations. Once again, the author must assume that there can be no cross-examination, or
objections made at the trial.
ITHucDiDEs, CompiETE WarrimNs 14 (Modem Library ed. Crawley transl. 1951).
OP. 103.
2P. 3.
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.A., Colorado College; M.A.
1952, LL.B. 1955, University of Colorado; LL.M., 1958, Yale. Member, Colorado Bar.

